March 22, 2009
Kyocera expands to EU via acquisition of TA Triumph-Adler
Kyocera is one of Japan's powerful electrical companies, which together are about as large economically as the whole of the Netherlands.
Taking advantage of low EURO exchange rates and the high YEN, and low valuations during the current economic crisis, Kyocera acquired 93.84% of TA Triumph-Adler AG for a total purchase price on the order of EURO 98.7 Million.
Triumph was founded 1896 as a bicycle maker, and has grown into a major European office equipment manufacturer and sales company. Triumph used to be famous for typewriters, with the disappearance of typewriters, Triumph went through a long sequence of restructuring and through many merger and acquisition transactions.
Kyocera acquired TA Triumph-Adler for its distribution network: TA Triumph-Adler has about 35,000 companies as customers in 33 countries, with 70% of sales in Germany, giving Kyocera a much larger distribution footprint in Germany and EU.
For an overview and analysis of Japan's formidable electrical companies read our J-ELECTRIC report.
Taking advantage of low EURO exchange rates and the high YEN, and low valuations during the current economic crisis, Kyocera acquired 93.84% of TA Triumph-Adler AG for a total purchase price on the order of EURO 98.7 Million.
Triumph was founded 1896 as a bicycle maker, and has grown into a major European office equipment manufacturer and sales company. Triumph used to be famous for typewriters, with the disappearance of typewriters, Triumph went through a long sequence of restructuring and through many merger and acquisition transactions.
Kyocera acquired TA Triumph-Adler for its distribution network: TA Triumph-Adler has about 35,000 companies as customers in 33 countries, with 70% of sales in Germany, giving Kyocera a much larger distribution footprint in Germany and EU.
For an overview and analysis of Japan's formidable electrical companies read our J-ELECTRIC report.
Labels: kyocera, ta triumph-adler, triumph-adler
December 10, 2008
NOKIA quits Japan - for now...
NOKIA's Japan subsidiary was founded on April 3, 1989 - almost 20 years ago. On November 27, 2008 NOKIA announced to terminate selling mobile phones to Japan's mobile operators, effectively withdrawing from Japan (except for purchasing, R&D and VERTU).
NOKIA's sales figures in Japan were a well kept secret until last week when several Japanese newspapers wrote that NOKIA sold 200,000 phones during FY 2007: thus NOKIA's market share was 0.39% - after 20 years of market entry efforts.
Considering the disastrous collapse of mobile phone handset sales in Japan, NOKIA's move to quit sales in Japan actually makes a lot of sense. Nothing prevents NOKIA from re-entering Japan again in the future.
NOKIA's sales figures in Japan were a well kept secret until last week when several Japanese newspapers wrote that NOKIA sold 200,000 phones during FY 2007: thus NOKIA's market share was 0.39% - after 20 years of market entry efforts.
Considering the disastrous collapse of mobile phone handset sales in Japan, NOKIA's move to quit sales in Japan actually makes a lot of sense. Nothing prevents NOKIA from re-entering Japan again in the future.
November 19, 2008
Nomura CEO, Kenichi Watanabe speaks about the Lehman Brothers acquisition
Nomura CEO, Kenichi Watanabe, today gave a presentation about the acquisition of the former Lehman Brothers operations in Europe & ME, Japan, Asia (ex-Japan) and in India.
Nomura acquired:
Europe and ME:
Equities and investment banking operations (approx 250 people)
Fixed income staff (approx 150 people)
Japan:
approx. 1100 people
Asia (ex-Japan):
approx. 1500 people
India:
three subsidiaries, in total approx 2900 people
LB Services India, IT, Global servicing
LB Financial Services India, research services
LB Structured Finance Services, Capital Markets Support and Analytics
Synergies:
Nomura is strong in mutual funds (74.2% of business)
Lehman is strong in hedge funds (56.8% of business)
Nomura is strong in retail
Lehman is strong in wholesale
Nomura plans three phases:
Phase 1: x-Lehman staff join Nomura
Phase 2: start joint operations
Phase 3: promote efficiency
Phase 4: create synergies
Q&A (there was an extensive Q&A session), selected questions were:
Question: Could the Lehman acquisition be seen as a "reverse takeover", ie Lehman people taking over Nomura?
Answer: any kind of takeover, foreign staff taking over, new hires taking over, long term employees taking over is ok for Nomura, if it makes the customers, shareholders and employees happy.
Question: how does Nomura plan to cover the acquisition costs, how does Nomura plan to become profitable, and could there be cuts in headcount?
Answer: we will right-size in each business area according to the necessities in each business area, and in some business division we are hiring and increasing headcount.
Question: what about highly paid "talents" and high bonus payments? Could there be friction with existing Nomura employees?
Answer: Nomura already has several thousand employees with about 50 or more nationalities, and some are paid more than the CEO of Nomura, so we are already familiar with this situation. Currently Goldman-Sachs CEO and top executives have announced that they will not receive any bonus payments. We will hope that this will be understood in our company as well.
Question: Will the acquisition mean an end to lifetime employment and bring the introduction of performance based payment?
We must make sure that we satisfy our clients, we will focus to deliver the services our clients need.
Nomura acquired:
Europe and ME:
Equities and investment banking operations (approx 250 people)
Fixed income staff (approx 150 people)
Japan:
approx. 1100 people
Asia (ex-Japan):
approx. 1500 people
India:
three subsidiaries, in total approx 2900 people
LB Services India, IT, Global servicing
LB Financial Services India, research services
LB Structured Finance Services, Capital Markets Support and Analytics
Synergies:
Nomura is strong in mutual funds (74.2% of business)
Lehman is strong in hedge funds (56.8% of business)
Nomura is strong in retail
Lehman is strong in wholesale
Nomura plans three phases:
Phase 1: x-Lehman staff join Nomura
Phase 2: start joint operations
Phase 3: promote efficiency
Phase 4: create synergies
Q&A (there was an extensive Q&A session), selected questions were:
Question: Could the Lehman acquisition be seen as a "reverse takeover", ie Lehman people taking over Nomura?
Answer: any kind of takeover, foreign staff taking over, new hires taking over, long term employees taking over is ok for Nomura, if it makes the customers, shareholders and employees happy.
Question: how does Nomura plan to cover the acquisition costs, how does Nomura plan to become profitable, and could there be cuts in headcount?
Answer: we will right-size in each business area according to the necessities in each business area, and in some business division we are hiring and increasing headcount.
Question: what about highly paid "talents" and high bonus payments? Could there be friction with existing Nomura employees?
Answer: Nomura already has several thousand employees with about 50 or more nationalities, and some are paid more than the CEO of Nomura, so we are already familiar with this situation. Currently Goldman-Sachs CEO and top executives have announced that they will not receive any bonus payments. We will hope that this will be understood in our company as well.
Question: Will the acquisition mean an end to lifetime employment and bring the introduction of performance based payment?
We must make sure that we satisfy our clients, we will focus to deliver the services our clients need.
October 18, 2008
"Four critical factors for Japanese corporates making major international acquisitions", Stuart Chambers, CEO of NSG Group
Stuart Chambers, CEO of NSG Group, gave a press conference on October 16, 2008, here are some notes and thoughts.
On February 16th, 2006, Nippon Sheet Glass' offer for the 80% of Pilkington plc it did not already own, for US$ 3.14 billion in total, was accepted by Pilkington's share holders and the acquisition was completed in June 2006. At the 142nd Annual Shareholder Meeting on June 27th 2008, Stuart Chambers was appointed Representative Executive Director, President and CEO of NSG Group.
Here are some essential points of Stuart Chambers' presentation, entitled "Four critical factors for Japanese corporates making major international acquisitions".
The four critical factors in the title are:
1. Integration (share holders and customers demanded integration, because the value of the combined NSG + Pilkington after the acquisition must become bigger than the sum of its parts -> must change HR management, and board)
2. Repaying debt -> senior management must understand the balance sheet
3. Identifying growth opportunities for the future (glass for solar energy)
4. Succession
From the outset the aim was not to create a Japanese company with overseas subsidiaries, but to create an international company, headquartered in Japan and listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Therefore the greatest changes needed to be made in Japan.
NSG Group changed from an exclusively Japanese Board, to a new Board structure:
Board of Directors: 12 (7 Japanese + 5 non-Japanese) and
Executive Officers: 23 (11 Japanese + 12 non-Japanese)
These changes were necessary in order to retain non-Japanese management talent from leaving the acquired company after the merger.
The Board structure was changed from the traditional Kansayaku (Corporate Auditor) structure to a Board with Committees.
HR management changes from internal promotion according to time served in each job level to the international practice of combining internal and external hiring according to capability and demonstrated performance ignoring age as a factor.
On February 16th, 2006, Nippon Sheet Glass' offer for the 80% of Pilkington plc it did not already own, for US$ 3.14 billion in total, was accepted by Pilkington's share holders and the acquisition was completed in June 2006. At the 142nd Annual Shareholder Meeting on June 27th 2008, Stuart Chambers was appointed Representative Executive Director, President and CEO of NSG Group.
Here are some essential points of Stuart Chambers' presentation, entitled "Four critical factors for Japanese corporates making major international acquisitions".
The four critical factors in the title are:
1. Integration (share holders and customers demanded integration, because the value of the combined NSG + Pilkington after the acquisition must become bigger than the sum of its parts -> must change HR management, and board)
2. Repaying debt -> senior management must understand the balance sheet
3. Identifying growth opportunities for the future (glass for solar energy)
4. Succession
From the outset the aim was not to create a Japanese company with overseas subsidiaries, but to create an international company, headquartered in Japan and listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Therefore the greatest changes needed to be made in Japan.
NSG Group changed from an exclusively Japanese Board, to a new Board structure:
Board of Directors: 12 (7 Japanese + 5 non-Japanese) and
Executive Officers: 23 (11 Japanese + 12 non-Japanese)
These changes were necessary in order to retain non-Japanese management talent from leaving the acquired company after the merger.
The Board structure was changed from the traditional Kansayaku (Corporate Auditor) structure to a Board with Committees.
HR management changes from internal promotion according to time served in each job level to the international practice of combining internal and external hiring according to capability and demonstrated performance ignoring age as a factor.
Labels: globalization, japan, japanese, nippon sheet glass, NSG group, pilkington
September 21, 2008
Fashion retailer H&M opens first Japan store in Tokyo - Ginza on September 13, 2008
On September 13, 2008, Swedish fashion retailer H&M opened the first store in Japan in Ginza. One week after opening, customers are queuing in line to enter the store - typical waiting time is about 2 hours, daily number of visitors to the store are estimated ot be about 8000/day.
Closest foreign competitors in Japan include US retailer GAP, and Spanish retailer Inditex (Diseno Textil SA)'s ZARA.
Biggest Japanese competitor is Fast Retailing's UNIQLO.
H&M is preparing to open the second and third stores in Shibuya (photo below) and in Harajuku.
Our comments: H&M has had a very successful start and has created a successful opening "event". To be successful longterm H&M will have to:
Building site for second store in Shibuya.
Closest foreign competitors in Japan include US retailer GAP, and Spanish retailer Inditex (Diseno Textil SA)'s ZARA.
Biggest Japanese competitor is Fast Retailing's UNIQLO.
H&M is preparing to open the second and third stores in Shibuya (photo below) and in Harajuku.
Our comments: H&M has had a very successful start and has created a successful opening "event". To be successful longterm H&M will have to:
- sufficiently tune to Japan,
- continue to innovate,
- compete successfully especially with UNIQLO,
- compete successfully with Abercrombie & Fitch, which is planning to enter Japan's market in 2009
Building site for second store in Shibuya.
Labels: fashion, fast retailing, h and m, hennes, mauritz, retail, uniqlo
August 1, 2008
NTT-Data expands to Europe: Acquisition of Cirquent GmbH
Today, August 1, 2008, NTT Data and BMW agreed, that NTT Data will acquire 72.9% of the outstanding shares of Cirquent GmbH. Purpose is NTT Data's globalization.
Between 1992-2008 Cirquent was part of the BMW Group. Cirquent is No. 7 in the Luenendonk ranking of German system integrators. Among Cirquent customers are BMW, Deutsche Boerse, Muenchner Rueck (reinsurer), and T-Mobile Germany. Cirquent has about 1800 employees and achieved sales of EURO 286 Million in 2007.
Share ownership ratios after NTT Data's acquisition:
72.9% NTT Data
25.1% BMW AG
2% Cirquent GmbH employees
Read more about NTT Data, the NTT Group and Japan's telecom sector in our J-COMM report.
Between 1992-2008 Cirquent was part of the BMW Group. Cirquent is No. 7 in the Luenendonk ranking of German system integrators. Among Cirquent customers are BMW, Deutsche Boerse, Muenchner Rueck (reinsurer), and T-Mobile Germany. Cirquent has about 1800 employees and achieved sales of EURO 286 Million in 2007.
Share ownership ratios after NTT Data's acquisition:
72.9% NTT Data
25.1% BMW AG
2% Cirquent GmbH employees
Read more about NTT Data, the NTT Group and Japan's telecom sector in our J-COMM report.
Labels: acquisition, BMW, cirquent, NTT, NTT data
June 4, 2008
A European perspective on M&A in Japan
Presentation at the lunch meeting of the Danish Chamber of Commerce in Japan (DCCJ) on June 4, 2008.
Announcement
Photos of the event
Announcement text:
With the very high EURO and low valuations of many Japanese companies, and with changing attitudes in Japan, now is an excellent time for European companies to start or expand business in Japan.
There are many ways to start or expand business in Japan, and acquiring a Japanese company is one of the paths often selected by European companies to grow in Japan.
Some acquisitions of Japanese companies by European corporations have led to fantastic successes - while others have led to catastrophic failures.
The presentation will discuss the key factors for European companies to succeed in acquiring a Japanese company, and some of the key reasons for failure, based on the speakers 23 years of experience with Japan's high-tech sector.
Announcement
Photos of the event
Announcement text:
With the very high EURO and low valuations of many Japanese companies, and with changing attitudes in Japan, now is an excellent time for European companies to start or expand business in Japan.
There are many ways to start or expand business in Japan, and acquiring a Japanese company is one of the paths often selected by European companies to grow in Japan.
Some acquisitions of Japanese companies by European corporations have led to fantastic successes - while others have led to catastrophic failures.
The presentation will discuss the key factors for European companies to succeed in acquiring a Japanese company, and some of the key reasons for failure, based on the speakers 23 years of experience with Japan's high-tech sector.
January 1, 2008
Technorati
April 3, 2005
Briefing the President of Germany, Horst Koehler
On Sunday, April 3, 2005, The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Horst Koehler, - and about 30 VIPs accompanying him - on the first day of his visit to Japan was briefed by four outside experts at the Embassy of Germany in Tokyo in the areas of Economics, Politics, Culture and Technology of Japan.
I was asked to brief the President of Germany about Japan's technology sector. I prepared a 9 page document entitled "Japan is a technology superpower full of creativity and power to innovate", which was distributed to the press after the briefing.
Download my briefing in German language here (pdf file).
The President of the European Business Council (EBC), Richard Collasse, asked for an English translation - download the English language version of the briefing paper here.
I was asked to brief the President of Germany about Japan's technology sector. I prepared a 9 page document entitled "Japan is a technology superpower full of creativity and power to innovate", which was distributed to the press after the briefing.
Download my briefing in German language here (pdf file).
The President of the European Business Council (EBC), Richard Collasse, asked for an English translation - download the English language version of the briefing paper here.
Labels: bundespraesident, business, collasse, council, ebc, european, germany, horst, koehler, president
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